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Summary
Argentina’s democratic political system has been under considerable stress since
social protests over the country’s rapidly deteriorating economy led to the resignation
of President Fernando de la Rua on December 20, 2001.   After a  series of short-lived
interim presidents, Peronist Senator Eduardo Duhalde was sworn in to serve out the
remainder of de la Rua’s term of office until December 2003.  President Duhalde faces
critical political and economic challenges, most significantly his ability to quell social
unrest associated with the country’s financial instability. The dilemma for Duhalde is that
the economic measures to revive the economy likely will exacerbate social and political
tensions. President Bush has said that the United States is prepared to help Argentina
through the international financial institutions, but only when Argentina has  committed
to a sound and sustainable economic plan. This report, which will be updated as events
warrant, examines the Argentina’s political upheaval, the outlook for the Duhalde
government, and implications for the United States.  For information on the economic
situation, see CRS Report RS21072, The Financial Crisis in Argentina.
Political Background
Argentina’s recent political upheaval should be viewed in the context of its historical
political development.  Before 1930, Argentina enjoyed some 70 years of political stability
that facilitated rapid economic development, and made Argentina one of the world’s
wealthiest countries. It ranked seventh in the world in per capita income in the 1920s.1  In
contrast, from 1930 until 1983, Argentina experienced significant political instability,
characterized by numerous military coups, 25 presidents, 22 years of military rule, and 13
years of “Peronism.”2
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When the military intervened in 1943, the regime came to be dominated by a colonel
serving as Secretary of Labor, Juan Peron, who went on to build a formidable political
base through support from the rapidly growing union movement. Peron was elected
president in 1946 as the candidate of the Argentine Labor Party, which later became the
Peronist Party.  During his presidency, Peron bestowed considerable benefits on
Argentina’s working class through wage increases , fringe benefits, and the creation of a
social security system.  He also emphasized rapid industrialization of the economy by
establishing state-run industries protected by trade barriers, a process also known as
import-substitution industrialization.3  
Peron’s mobilization of the working class had an enduring effect on Argentina’s
political system over the next four decades.  Even when Peron was ousted by the military
in 1955, Peronism as a political movement survived despite attempts by the military and
anti-Peronist sectors to defeat it.  After his ouster, a series of civilian and military
governments ruled until 1973 when Peron was reelected to office after 18 years of exile.
Just a year later, however, Peron died and was succeeded by his second wife Isabel, who
had little political experience.  Economic and political chaos ensued, with political violence
surging and Argentina experiencing its first bout of hyperinflation.  
As a result, the military intervened once again in 1976, but this time ruled directly
until 1983, when it fell into disrepute in the aftermath of its failure in the Falkland Islands
(Islas Malvinas) war with Great Britain in 1982.  It was during this period that the military
conducted the so-called “Dirty War” against leftists, guerrillas, and their sympathizers, and
thousands of Argentines “disappeared.”  
In 1983, Argentina returned to civilian democratic rule with the election of Raul
Alfonsin of the moderate Radical Civic Union (UCR).  Alfonsin was widely credited with
restoring democratic institutions, but economic conditions during his tenure were chaotic,
with hyperinflation and considerable labor unrest.  As a result, Alfonsin left office six
months before his six-year term ended, letting the winner of the 1989 election, Carlos
Menem of the Justicialista Party (PJ, formerly the Peronist Party), take office early.
Menem transformed Argentina from a state-dominated protectionist economy to one
committed to free market principles and open to trade.  Most state enterprises were
privatized, hyperinflation was eliminated, and the economy was opened up to foreign trade
and investment.  In 1991, under the direction of Minister of Economy Domingo Cavallo,
the government pegged the Argentine peso to the U.S. dollar and limited the printing of
pesos to the extent that they were backed by U.S. dollars, a policy which helped keep
inflation in check, but as we now know, became a major factor in Argentina’s recent
financial turmoil.4  What made Menem’s transformation of the Argentina even more
extraordinary was that he broke with the traditional Peronist protectionist policies
favorable to the working-class and labor.  Under Menem, the PJ began to attract middle-
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class voters and even some business interests.5  Yet increasing corruption and high
unemployment at the end of Menem’s second term were factors that led to the defeat of
his party in the October 1999 elections – Menem himself was prohibited constitutionally
from seeking a third term.
From De la Rua to Duhalde
Fernando de la Rua won the October 1999 presidential race as the candidate of an
electoral coalition known as the Alliance for Work, Justice, and Education, that brought
together de la Rua’s moderate Radical Civic Union (UCR) and the leftist Front for a
Country in Solidarity (Frepaso). De la Rua ran on a platform of fighting corruption,
curbing crime, and funding new social programs by cracking down on tax evasion by the
rich.  Capturing about 48% of the vote, de la Rua soundly defeated the Peronist party
candidate, Eduardo Duhalde, who received 38%.  The Alliance also won the largest bloc
in the Chamber of Deputies, the lower house of the Argentine Congress, while the
Peronists controlled the Senate.
While there was initial optimism when de la Rua took office in December 1999, that
optimism had faded by the end of 2000  because of doubts about the government’s ability
to bring about economic recovery and because of corruption in the administration.  While
the government negotiated several financial arrangements with the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) in 2000 and 2001, the most recent in September 2001, the de la Rua
government was unable to fulfill IMF imposed conditions relating to spending cuts.  De
la Rua also faced problems within his own governing coalition, and Vice President Carlos
Alvarez of Frepaso resigned in October 2000 to protest the government’s failure to
aggressively investigate a Senate bribery scandal. 
Because of the declining popularity of the government, the Alliance fared poorly in
the October 2001 congressional elections.  As a result of the elections, the PJ continued
to control the 72-member Senate and became the largest bloc in the 257-Chamber of
Deputies.  Another party that fared well was the newly formed center-left Alternative for
a Republic of Equals (ARI) that won 17 seats in the lower house and became the third
most important bloc.  Comprised largely of dissidents from the Alliance, its base is
concentrated largely in Buenos Aires.  While ARI fared well, the center-right party of then
Finance Minister Domingo Cavallo, Action for the Republic (AR), lost three seats in the
lower house. Perhaps the most important outcome of the election was the rise in the blank
or negative vote, which accounted for 21% of all votes cast (compared to 6% in the 1999
election).  The large negative votes illustrated the population’s dissatisfaction with current
political parties, even the Peronists.  In some electoral districts, negative votes surpassed
those of the winning party.  The government’s loss in the elections made it more
dependent on the opposition, not only in Congress, but in the provinces, where Peronists
controlled many of the governorships.  De la Rua’s own coalition continued to have
problems, with 12 out of 17 Frepaso deputies leaving the coalition in late October 2001.6
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Meanwhile, the government faced a deepening economic crisis.  In November 2001,
President de la Rua announced a debt restructuring package that proved unsatisfactory to
the international financial institutions.  While the IMF provided some $12 billion in funding
to Argentina from March 2000 until September 2001, it ultimately declined further
financial support in December 2001 because Argentina could not produce a balanced
budget.  In late November, Argentines began rapidly withdrawing dollars from banks until
the government limited withdrawals to $1,000 per month. The denial of access to bank
funds, combined with already high poverty and unemployment rates after four years of
recession, sparked widespread opposition to the government.  The country’s major labor
confederations held two days of nationwide strikes beginning in mid-December in
opposition to the banking limitations and proposed austerity measures, while the
opposition-controlled Congress vowed to oppose the government’s proposal to cut
spending by one-fifth to balance the budget. 
As confidence in the government evaporated, widespread demonstrations erupted
around the country, with thousands calling for the President’s resignation and
supermarkets ransacked. President de la Rua responded by declaring a state of siege and
signing an emergency decree to provide food to provinces where there were protests.  Last
minute efforts by the President to work out a power-sharing arrangement with the
opposition proved unviable as widespread protests continued.  Middle class Argentines
participated in spontaneous demonstrations, filling the Plaza de Mayo in front of the
presidential palace in Buenos Aires.  Protests turned violent with rioters battling police
with stones and bottles. Some 28 people were killed in the protests and hundreds were
injured.  Some blamed riot police for over-reacting to peaceful demonstrations. 
As a result of the violent protests, President de la Rua fled the presidential palace and
resigned on December 20, 2001, paving the way for a series of interim presidents from the
Peronist party .  After de la Rua’s resignation, Senate  President Ramon Puerta agreed to
become president for 48 hours. On December 22, Governor Adolfo Rodriguez Saa,
became interim president with a term of 90 days until new elections could be held for
someone to serve for the remainder of de la Rua’s term. After just a week in office,
however, Rodriguez Saa resigned abruptly amid more protests.  Rodriguez Saa had upset
other Peronist leaders when he appeared to be positioning himself to run for president, and
protesters objected to his choice of cabinet members who were already tainted with
corruption accusations. The majority leader of the Chamber of Deputies, Eduardo
Caamano, then became interim president until the Peronists could agree on another
candidate.  Afer reportedly “negotiating multiple political deals with rival Peronist leaders
and opposition political parties,”7 Senator Eduardo Duhalde  became president on January
1, 2002, with a mandate from Congress to serve out the remainder of de la Rua’s term.
Dulhalde, who had been Vice President under Menem from 1989-1991, Governor of
Buenos Aires province, and the PJ’s 1999 presidential candidate, was one of the most well
known and powerful Peronist leaders.
Outlook
President Duhalde faces critical political and economic challenges, most significantly
his ability to quell social unrest associated with the country’s financial instability. The
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dilemma for Duhalde is that the economic measures to revive the economy likely will
exacerbate social and political tensions in the country.  President Duhalde announced on
January 6 that he was abandoning the currency dollar-peso currency peg, with a managed
devaluation of 1.4 pesos to the dollar for exports and official transactions and a free
floating peso for other transactions.  The devaluation and pending fiscal cuts to balance
the budget will aggravate social tensions in a country that has endured four years of
recession, with unemployment approaching 20% and a poverty rate of 40%.  How the
government handles the relaxation of banking controls has been described by Duhalde
himself as a time-bomb.  The limit will be difficult to dismantle without bankrupting the
nation’s banking system.  Beginning January 23, 2002, Argentines were allowed to
exchange up to $5,000 from frozen dollar accounts into devalued pesos, but many
complained about the erosion of their savings and the lack of full access to their savings.
In contrast to Argentina’s economic policy of opening and liberalization in the 1990s,
Duhalde has promised such populist measures as increasing the state’s role in the economy
and protecting local industries.  Yet at the same time, the President expects to negotiate
with the IMF for billions more in assistance to shore up the financial system.  Such
assistance seems unlikely if Argentina pursues a protectionist economic model. 
President Duhalde appealed on January 14, 2002 for national unity to prevent
additional unrest and anarchy, and he called on business, union and political leaders to
work together to rebuild the country.  It remains unclear whether Duhalde’s efforts will
be enough to curtail the middle-class protests that led to the resignation of two presidents.
Duhalde also faces formidable challenges within the political system.  While the Peronists
control the Senate and have the largest bloc in Congress, the PJ has been characterized by
factionalism that could eventually pose a threat to Duhalde’s rule. One major Peronist
figure and potential Duhalde critic, Buenos Aires Governor Carlos Ruckhuaf, was brought
into the cabinet to serve as Foreign Minister, but former President Carlos Menem has been
a vocal critic of the new administration.  Moreover, as the October 2003 presidential
elections approach, Duhalde could face increasing challenges from Peronist rivals wanting
to run.  Menem, who at this juncture remains unpopular because of his association with
an arms smuggling scandal, has aspirations to run for a third presidential term. At this
juncture, the opposition Alliance coalition, particularly the UCR, is in disarray because of
the failure of de la Rua’s presidency. What may be more of a threat to the Duhalde
government is the rise of public dissatisfaction with the traditional political parties.  As
noted, while the Peronists won the largest blocs in Congress in the October 2001 elections,
over one-fifth of the electorate cast a blank or negative votes.  
Some observers believe with social unrest continuing, and riots and street violence
similar to that in December, the Argentine military could step into the political vacuum and
assume power, with support from the middle class.  Others dispute this scenario, arguing
that Argentina’s military is thoroughly discredited because of its involvement in massive
human rights violations while it was in power in the 1970s.  They believe that the down-
sized Argentine military has no interest in governing, and will remain on the sidelines. 
Implications for the United States
Amid Argentina’s recent political upheaval and financial crisis, the United States has
taken a tougher approach in deciding whether to support large-scale rescue effort by the
international financial institutions. In the past, the United States has supported IMF
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backing for Argentina, most recently in August 2001, when the Bush Administration
agreed to an additional $8 billion in IMF lending. In the current crisis, President Bush has
said that the United States is prepared to help Argentina through the international financial
institutions, but only when Argentina has  committed to a sound and sustainable economic
plan, including tough fiscal and monetary measures. President Bush noted in mid-January
2002 that “America is deeply concerned about the difficulties facing our ally and friend,”
but stated that Argentina needs to strengthen its commitment to market-based reform, not
weaken it.8 
Argentina’s recent crisis could have significant implications for the United States and
for U.S. policy in Latin America.   While most economic analysts maintain that  there is
not a threat of financial contagion to other Latin American nations, the crisis could still
have significant economic implications.  If President Duhalde turns his populist rhetoric
into concrete protectionist actions, there could be an effect on the momentum toward
hemispheric free-trade and negotiations for a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).
Duhalde has already indicated that he wants to strengthen ties within Latin America,
especially Brazil, as a means of challenging the United States on trade issues. How forceful
such a policy can be is questionable, given Argentina’s need for international financial
assistance. The open, free-market model of economic development in the region could be
jeopardized if Argentina moves toward erecting protectionist trade barriers. Another
economic implication involves losses by foreign-owned banks operating in Argentina. The
extent to which Argentina shifts the cost of its devaluation to the banks will have an effect
on U.S. banks operating in the county, such as Citigroup and FleetBoston Financial
Group.
Some observers judge that Argentina’s political upheaval raises the threat of political
contagion in Latin America, ushering in a wave of destabilizing populism. They argue that
Argentina’s new embrace of populism could influence upcoming elections in Colombia,
Ecuador, and Brazil,9 and could discredit the  free market/democratic model that the
United States strongly advocates.  Such a shift, it is argued, could complicate U.S.
relations with the region and lead to less cooperation on bilateral and regional issues. 
Another potential problem for the United States is its stance on a rescue package,
which may create the perception that it is deserting a close ally in time of need.  U.S.-
Argentine relations have been strong since the country’s return to democracy in 1983, and
were especially close during the Menem presidency.  Argentina has made contributions to
peacekeeping operations worldwide, participated in the Gulf War, and contributed to
operations in Haiti.  Because of its military contributions, President Clinton designated
Argentina as a major non-NATO ally in 1997, a status that gives Argentina access to
grants of surplus military hardware. Some observers fear that United States will be
perceived in Argentina and throughout Latin America as an unreliable friend if it is not
more active in helping Argentina come up with a sustainable economic program. Others
see the U.S. stance as a necessary reaction in light of Argentina’s need for domestic reform
before external financing can have a positive effect.
